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I wish to express my gratitude to Professor Annette Clark and the
students of the Seattle University Law Review for inviting me to
participate in this symposium, and to submit my remarks for publica-
tion. Although this essay reflects the essence of my remarks, I have
taken the liberty of clarifying and expanding upon a few points.
I. INTRODUCTION
When I was asked to speak at this conference, I was at first
hesitant to participate. In fact, I dreaded the prospect of speaking
about the legalization of physician-assisted suicide. It's not that I have
nothing to say on the issue; like everyone here, I too have something
to say about it. Nor have I failed to think about this issue; on the
contrary, I've had more than ample opportunity to ponder it. If I've
thought about the topic enough to have something to say about it, why
would I hesitate accepting this invitation? Why would I dread talking
about an issue that has achieved such prominence?
Basically, there are two reasons. First, we seem to have lost our
ability to speak with one another about issues such as this. Instead of
engaging one another in a conversation, we have substituted diatribe
for dialogue and discord for discourse. The rhetoric of rights, and the
simplistic thinking that such rhetoric creates and sustains, impedes our
ability and even our willingness to listen to one another. The "I'm
right; you're wrong" mentality that dominates these debates makes it
impossible to get a word in edgewise. What is supposed to be a
conversation becomes an occasion for sloganeering and moral jingoism.
And I have no interest in participating in an exchange of views that
proceeds in a manner that serves not to advance the discussion, but
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only to corrode the foundations of a democratic society.1 Disagree
though we must and should over a matter as controversial as this one,
once we become intolerant of and impatient with those whose views
differ from our own, we cease listening as closely as we must to what
each of us has to say. Once we stop listening to one another, once we
no longer take one another seriously, once we cease engaging one
another in the sort of conversation on which a democratic society rests,
we cease behaving democratically.
Second, even if this is a matter that we must converse about, I
doubt that it merits the attention it receives. Were I asked to list those
aspects of our health care system that we should devote our time and
energy to discussing, or to list those features of a decent health care
system that we should dedicate our scarce resources to, physician-
assisted suicide would be near, if not at, the bottom of that list. From
my perspective, physician-assisted suicide is a moralizing distraction.
It enables those who spend their time promoting or opposing it to
convince themselves and others that they are engaged in a battle royal,
engaging an issue whose resolution will define the moral fiber of the
nation. This debate enables the rest of us to watch and even partici-
pate, fostering the belief that we are doing something important about
how we live and die in the United States. Meanwhile, we neglect such
other matters as health care reform and access to care.
From my perspective, the fuss about physician-assisted suicide is
about as important as re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.
Given the current state of our health care system, which remains in a
state of crisis regardless-and perhaps because of-what did not
happen last year, the legalization of physician-assisted suicide is
morally essential only to those who are indifferent to the health care
needs and concerns of most Americans.
You now know that I do have something to say about this issue.
Instead of engaging in the debate, however, I intend to engage the
debate. By that, I mean that I intend to expose some of the myths. that
surround this issue, and to challenge the notion that it is or should be
the moral issue of the day. If I am hesitant or fearful of speaking, it
1. While it was possible to elaborate somewhat on this point during my remarks at the
conference, for the purposes of this essay it is best to refer the reader to the growing literature in
this area. See, e.g., JEAN B. ELSHTAIN, DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL (1995); CHRISTOPHER LASCH,
THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES AND THE BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY (1995); ROBERT D.
PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: Civic TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993);
JAMES D. HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991); JAMES
D. HUNTER, BEFORE THE SHOOTING BEGINS (1994); MARY A. GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK:
THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
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is not because I have nothing to say, but because I wonder whether
what I have to say will be heard.
II. WHAT'S THE QUESTION?
Amidst those who believe that it is certainly right to legalize
physician-assisted suicide and those who contend that it is certainly
right to prohibit such conduct, I find myself uncertain about what to
say or do. I am willing to concede that there may be instances in
which it is morally appropriate to help a patient commit suicide, and
agree that, as a rule, consenting adults may establish what constitutes
acceptable behavior as between themselves. I am not convinced that
what some think about assisted suicide as a private matter, however,
necessarily means that we all must endorse it as a matter of public
policy. Deciding what course of action we wish to take as a society
involves considerably more than agreeing that a private course of
conduct may be morally right, or that consent justifies what two
individuals decide to do within the context of a given relationship.
Regardless of the moral questions this issue raises, the question of its
legalization is a public policy matter.
Essentially, we need to determine whether the advantages of
changing the law outweigh the disadvantages, or whether the difficul-
ties created by leaving the law as it is merit changing the law at all.
We need to assess and evaluate the arguments made in favor of this
right, and determine whether the legalization of physician-assisted
suicide is, on balance, the prudent course of action.
For myself, I doubt the soundness of the arguments put forth by
those who advocate the legalization of physician-assisted suicide. It
does not seem to me that the arguments hold together. The arguments
also fail to make a compelling case for the proposition that we will be
in the Dark Ages if we do not change the law. I doubt that the
legalization of physician-assisted suicide is the next step we must take
if we are to be a morally progressive society or that it represents the"cutting edge" issue some of its advocates make it out to be. Just as
I doubt that those who advocate the legalization of assisted suicide
constitute the vanguard of moral progress, I doubt that those who
resist those efforts are the defenders of all that a decent society should
stand for.
Ultimately, this means that I do not view this issue from the
simplistic perspective afforded those who adhere to either the "pro-
choice" or "pro-life" agenda; nor do I agree with many of those who,
as self-styled advocates for patients or for persons with disabilities,
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purport to speak for their constituents and to "know" what they
want.2 I wish to elaborate on these points.
III. SHOULD WE MODERNIZE DEATH?
The argument in favor of the legalization of physician-assisted
suicide is fairly straightforward. Simply put, if you are in favor of self-
determination and against pain and suffering, then you must favor the
legalization of physician-assisted suicide.' Because it advances the
goals of promoting patient self-determination and preventing unneces-
sary suffering, the legalization of physician-assisted suicide upholds two
values that we highly prize: autonomy and beneficence. Thus, the
legalization of physician-assisted suicide offers something to both
patients and physicians, advancing their interests simultaneously. It
seems there are good reasons to support this change in the law, and no
good reason to resist it.
Politically and rhetorically speaking, this is a very nice argument.
It is simple, uncomplicated, and easy to grasp; it can probably be made
to fit onto a bumper sticker. Yet what makes it so attractive is what
makes it so seductive and dangerous. First, this argument suggests
that the issue is syllogistically simple, as if questions about how we are
to die can be reduced to the moral equivalent of an algorithm. Such
an approach obscures the complex, nuanced, ambiguous, and ambiva-
lent nature of dying.4 Second, this argument promotes the sort of
2. Having spent three years working with patients and families, I am convinced that they
are capable of speaking for themselves. I doubt that we listen to them as attentively as we should.
3. See Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution and Hastening Inevitable Death, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 20; Robert F. Weir, The Morality of Physician-Assisted Suicide, 20 LAW,
MED. & HEALTH CARE 116(1992). Because the literature on physician-assisted suicide is so vast
and redundant, I offer the reader an eclectic sampling of those articles that are representative of
the perspective typically brought to bear on this issue. Nothing is intended by including some
authors and not including others.
4. Although I am not a physician, my three years of work in the clinical setting gave me the
impression that death is much more uncertain and contingent than we would like to believe.
Based on the numerous television shows, articles, and books that attempt to tell us what dying"is like," it follows that many of us must want to know what it is going to be like to die, perhaps
because we dread the anxiety created by not knowing. I concur with the view of those who, like
E.M. Forster in commenting on how we are born and how we die, observed that these experiences
are strange, indeed, alien to us,
because they are at the same time experiences and not experiences. We only know of
them by report. We were all born, but we cannot remember what it was like. And
death is coming even as birth has come, but, similarly, we do not know what it is like.
Our final experience, like our first, is conjectural. We move between two darknesses.
Certain people pretend to tell us what birth and death are like[.]... But it is all from
the outside, and the two entities who might enlighten us, the baby and the corpse,
cannot do so, because their apparatus for communicating their experiences is not attuned
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bumper-sticker mentality and moral jingoism that has come to
dominate discussions of such matters, and the dangerous polarization
and dichotomization I alluded to earlier. Once one pierces the rhetoric,
it is fairly easy to see where the difficulties lie.
A. Physician-Assisted Suicide as the Next Possible Step?
First of all, in arguing that the legalization of physician-assisted
suicide is the logical next step for the "right-to-die" movement to take,
advocates of this perspective gloss over some important aspects of what
that movement has concerned itself with until now. While the "right-
to-die" movement has dedicated itself to advancing the cause of patient
self-determination, it has not done so in ways that lend unquestioned
support to the argument that physician-assisted suicide is the logical
next step that the movement must take.
For the past twenty-five years, the primary focus of the "right-to-
die" movement has been to resist the medicalization of death. From
the Quinlan5 case through the Cruzan6 case and beyond, the move-
ment has directed its efforts toward protecting a patient's right to die
a natural death. This explains why Living Will Acts are often referred
to as Natural Death Acts. A central concern of the legislation and
litigation that has dominated this area has been to resist the medicaliza-
tion of death-to enable patients to die without the encumbrances of
tubes, ventilators, cardiopulmonary cerebral resuscitation, dialysis,
surgery, transfusions, and drugs. In short, the concern has been about
preserving the right to die the way we used to die before advances in
medicine and medical technology enabled physicians to attenuate the
dying process; it has been about insuring that patients, not doctors,
determine when and how such a death is to occur.
To the extent the "right-to-die" movement has concerned itself
with resisting the medicalization of death, it is difficult to see how the
right to die a drug-induced death, made possible only by a physician's
intervention, can be regarded as the logical next step. The legalization
of physician-assisted suicide does not naturalize death, it medicalizes
death. Setting aside the question of whether we should or should not
take this step, one cannot say that it flows inexorably from those which
to our apparatus for reception.
E.M. FORSTER, ASPECTS OF THE NOVEL 76 (1927). Of all the many attempts to convey what
dying is like, for my money the best current offering is SHERWIN B. NULAND, How WE DIE:
REFLECTIONS ON LIFE'S FINAL CHAPTER (1994), because it is as blunt as it is uncertain about
what it is like to die.
5. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
6. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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have come before it. If anything, physician-assisted suicide endorses
the view that "technology" can "fix" our problems, a sentiment not
found in the "right-to-die" movement's tendency to oppose technologi-
cally-enhanced death.
B. Differentiating the Two "Rights-to-Die"
Another assumption, or myth, is that the right to forgo life-
sustaining treatment and the right to physician-assisted suicide are the
same "right-to-die." They are not. Just how different the one "right-
to-die" is from the other becomes clearer when we consider the
philosophical principles on which each rests.
Where the "right-to-die" consists of a decision to forgo life-
sustaining treatment, it rests on a familiar principle: the right to
protect one's physical integrity against unwarranted intrusion. At
common law, this right was protected by the action for battery-a
trespass of the person which was permitted only if the individual had
consented. Out of these simple considerations grew the notion that
patients have the right to refuse treatment, even life-sustaining
treatment. The right not to be touched against one's wishes is the
value that underlies the principle of self-determination protected under
the law in the name of the "right to die."' In the world of philosophy
and ethics, this has meant respecting a patient's negative right of
noninterference-the right to be let alone. Respecting that right
requires forbearance; we must either not initiate treatment or withdraw
a treatment we have initiated. Whichever it is, we are to back off.
Where the "right-to-die" consists of physician-assisted suicide,
respecting this right requires doctors to assist, not desist. Medical
forbearance simply will not produce the desired result. Whether the
patient's request is for a prescription or an injection, the type of death
the patient wants will not occur if the physician fails to provide a
specific good or service. The doctor must do something for the
patient, not simply stop doing something to the patient. Physician-
assisted suicide, therefore, has nothing to do with respecting a patient's
negative rights; it has to do with respecting a patient's positive rights.9
7. As Professor Jonsen has indicated: "Active euthanasia for the voluntary and competent
patient seems so plausible and liberal. Yet it suggests a technologic solution to a perennial human
problem." Albert R. Jonsen, Death, Politics and Philosophy, 157 W. J. MED. 192, 193 (1992).
8. RuTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 3-49 (1986); ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE 49-54 (1989).
9. Because Professor Paul Menzel disputed this point, arguing that decisions to forgo life-
sustaining treatment rest on a negative right and that physician-assisted suicide rests on what he
termed a "virtual" negative right, it may be helpful to refer the reader to a basic text on medical
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On this point, a few observations are in order. It is generally
agreed that one cannot derive a positive right from a negative right.
As every first year law student knows, the duty not to commit a
battery does not generate a duty to rescue; a duty not to touch does not
generate a duty to render aid. For this reason one cannot argue that
the right to physician-assisted suicide naturally or logically grows out
of a patient's right to refuse treatment. The one has nothing to do
with the other-at least not insofar as respecting a negative right
creates a duty to respect a positive right.
In order to legitimate the right to physician-assisted suicide, we
would have to acknowledge that the right of self-determination ought
to embrace positive as well as negative rights. For years we have said
that patients do not have positive rights to health care; that's how we
justify saying that patients have no "right" to health care or to specific
services from physicians. To acknowledge that patients do have
positive rights constitutes a remarkable reversal in thought, albeit one
that is long overdue. What is odd about this reversal is that we are
attempting to begin by recognizing a patient's right to enlist a
physician's assistance in dying-not in living.
If we are to recognize positive rights, then why not dedicate
ourselves to protecting the patient's right to receive the sort of care that
makes life worth living? If we were to tell patients that we are going
to recognize their positive rights, and offer them the options of living
a better life or dying a quicker death, are we so certain that they would
prefer life-ending medication to life-enhancing medical services? Does
anyone really believe that if we were to tell patients that they now have
a right to health care, the first item on their wish list would be
physician-assisted suicide?1"
Not only are the right to forgo treatment and the right to
physician-assisted suicide conceptually distinguishable, they are
empirically different. Running through the arguments made by
proponents of the legalization of physician-assisted suicide is the notion
that this activity is "just like" what doctors do when they forgo life-
ethics:
Whereas a positive right is a right to be provided with a particular good or service by
others, a negative right is a right to be free from some action taken by others. A
person's positive right entails another's obligation to do something for that person; a
negative right entails another's obligation to refrain from doing something.
TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 72-73 (4th
ed. 1994).
10. Of course, if we told them that they have the right to demand only as much health care
as they can afford, we still might find patients willing to pay for the quick exit from our health
care system that physician-assisted suicide offers them.
1995]
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sustaining treatment. To explain fully the distinction between a
decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment and physician-assisted
suicide would require an elaborate and tedious exegesis on such topics
as mens rea, actus reus, cause in fact, and proximate cause. Short of
such discussion, there is an easier way to discern the fine line that
separates killing from non-killing where medical professionals are
concerned.
The law has held that decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment
do not give rise to civil or criminal liability, if they are made in the
right way and for the right reasons.11 Before examining what the law
says about assisted suicide and the sensibility of the law's concern in
that area, however, we need to be clear about what the law does and
does not say about taking someone off life-sustaining treatment.
The law does not hold that taking someone off life-sustaining
treatment can never run afoul of the criminal law. For example, if
someone wandered through a hospital's intensive care unit, intentional-
ly disconnecting patients from ventilators, would we allow that person
to claim immunity on the grounds that decisions to forgo life-
sustaining treatment do not give rise to criminal or civil liability? I
doubt it. Similarly, if a physician, on his or her own initiative,
disconnected patients from life-sustaining treatment, we would not say
that no questions of civil or criminal liability arise. Dying patients can
be murdered, and one way of murdering them is to indiscriminately
and unjustifiably disconnect them from life-sustaining treatment.
Courts have ruled that when such a decision is properly reached
and properly carried out, even though it does hasten death, the decision
does not violate the prohibition against the wrongful taking of a human
life.12 What the law has done here is to reconcile eighteenth century
concepts of homicide to the twentieth century's ability to prolong life.
11. Leonard H. Glantz, Withholding and Withdrawing Treatment: The Role of the Criminal
Law, 15 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 231 (1987).
12. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279-80 (1990) (finding
that a competent person's constitutionally derived liberty interest to refuse life-saving treatment
may, given proper procedural safeguards, transfer to a representative of that person when that
person becomes incompetent); Thor v. Supreme Court of Solano County, 855 P.2d 375, 383 (Cal.
1993) (concluding that a health care provider has no duty to treat a person declining treatment
after "reasonable disclosure" of the alternatives and their respective risks); In 7e Dubreuil, 629 So.
2d 819, 823-24 (Fla. 1993) (finding that "[w]hen a health care provider, acting in good faith,
follows the wishes of a competent and informed patient to refuse medical treatment, the health
care provider is acting appropriately and cannot be subjected to civil or criminal liability.");
Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1270 (Mass. 1992) (discussing assisted suicide and
adopting the trial court's finding that the disease rather than the removal of feeding and hydration
tubes causes death, and finding that "[m]edical ethics do not require health care professionals to
preserve life in every circumstance").
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Because we can extend life, a decision not to extend life arguably
becomes a decision to hasten death; the civil and criminal law are quite
clear on the point that one person normally may not cause, i.e. hasten,
another's death. If the law had remained rigid on this point, medicine
would have been stopped dead in its tracks, because any decision to
forgo treatment would raise questions of criminal and civil liability.
But because the only way we can offer patients and doctors the chance
to prolong life-use life-sustaining treatment-is by also allowing them
to decide when to cease such efforts, we have had to explain why this
manner of "hastening death" does not give rise to civil or criminal
liability.
The law has reconciled itself to this result by closely scrutinizing
the legal cause of the patient's death and the intentions of those who
participate in a decision to forgo treatment. Insofar as the legal cause
of death is concerned, even if the immediate cause of death is the
cessation of treatment, the legal cause of death is the underlying
condition that caused the patient to be dependent on life-sustaining
technology. For example, if a patient refuses chemotherapy, he or she
is said to have died of cancer, a natural cause of death. If a patient is
taken off life-sustaining treatment necessitated by injuries sustained in
a motor vehicle accident, the cause of death will be the motor vehicle
accident. If a patient dies as the result of a suicide attempt that
medical intervention was unable to reverse, the cause of death is
suicide. Finally, if treatment for a lethal wound inflicted by an
assailant is stopped and the patient dies as a result, what was an assault
or an attempted murder charge can become a murder charge.
While all of this may sound like fancy footwork on the law's part,
it reflects the law's desire to allow life-sustaining treatment to be used
or not used in ways that accommodate the legitimate concerns of
patients, physicians, and society. The same is true where the intent of
the parties involved in the decision to forgo treatment is concerned.
Because the intention is not to cause the death of the patient (someone
or something else already has done that), but to respect the patient's
right not to be treated against his or her wishes, the state of mind
brought to bear on a decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment is not
the state of mind associated with the taking of a human life. 3
13. Another way to think about this is to consider those cases where a decision to forgo
treatment is made, but the patient does not die. While such a decision is made with the
expectation that death will follow, it is not made with the intention that death should follow.
Thus, if a patient unexpectedly survives a decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment, one would
not expect those who participated in such a decision to be charged with attempted murder.
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Are decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment "just like"
physician-assisted suicide? The easiest way to see how different they
are is to consider the case of Diane, Dr. Timothy Quill's celebrated
patient.14 Diane was dying of leukemia, and ended her life by taking
the medication Dr. Quill had prescribed for her-a medication he
knew was intended for that purpose. Was her death "just like" that
of someone who decides to forgo treatment? No. Was her death
accidental? Hardly. Did she die of natural causes? No. If she had
died simply as the result of forgoing treatment, we could say that she
died of natural causes; but dying of a drug overdose is not dying of
natural causes in any known jurisdiction. Was the cause of her death
unknown? Again, the answer is no.
Only two possible boxes remain in which to put her death:
Homicide or suicide. This explains Dr. Quill's dilemma when he
reported Diane's death to the coroner. Had she simply committed
suicide, by being one of those patients who stores medicine unbe-
knownst to her physician, or by using such non-medical means as a
gun, knife, rope, water, or carbon monoxide, we could safely, but
regrettably, say that Diane had simply killed herself. But Diane did
not simply kill herself. She killed herself with the knowing assistance
of someone else. Because assisted suicide is a form of homicide, that
left Dr. Quill with only one box to check off.
When Dr. Quill reports Diane's cause of death to the coroner, we
can see just how different her death is from that of someone who
refuses treatment. Although he reports that she died of acute
leukemia, he does this to avoid the investigation and autopsy that
would result had he reported her death as a suicide."5 If the death
that patients die as the result of physician-assisted suicide were "just
like" the death they die when they decide to forgo life-sustaining
treatment, we would have no problem attributing Diane's death to
natural causes. But we cannot do so without being dishonest about the
legal cause of her death.
14. See Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324
NEW ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991).
15. I should also mention the death certificate where I recorded acute leukemia as
proximate cause of death. Had I acknowledged the contribution of the barbiturate
overdose to the medical examiner, everyone who was present, including the family,
would be interrogated and an uninvited autopsy would follow even if the patient's
underlying disease was known for certain. I definitely could not subject Diane or her
family to such a process, so I avoided the issue by writing "acute leukemia" as the cause
of death.
Timothy E. Quill, Risk Taking by Physicians in Legally Gray Areas, 57 ALB. L. REV. 693, 703
(1994).
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This means two things insofar as the debate is concerned. First,
deaths like Diane's are not "just like" the deaths of patients who forgo
life-sustaining treatment because they do not fit into the boxes
normally reserved for deaths that follow such decisions. Second, the
legalization of assisted suicide would require us to create a new
category for death on the death certificate; the fact that we have to
create a new box is proof that this death is not "just like" the deaths
that now occur when patients forgo life-sustaining treatment.1 6
C. Practical Problems with Legalization
Once one moves beyond the conceptual and empirical inconsisten-
cies that plague this area, one comes to thornier, more practical
problems. Even if those who advocate the legalization of physician-
assisted suicide were honest enough to admit that it is not the same
right that the courts have been struggling with for years, this would
not end the difficulties. Assuming that it is a legitimate new right, we
must consider the legal consequences of recognizing it as such.
One myth that pervades this area is that we can and will enact
legislation that limits the exercise of this right to competent adults who
are terminally ill, and who satisfy other qualifications about the nature
and duration of their pain and suffering and the numerosity and
sincerity of their requests for assistance. 17 Faith in such safeguards
rests on two assumptions: (1) Physicians can and will make these
assessments accurately, reliably, fairly, and objectively, and (2) such a
statute will survive legal challenge.
There is no basis for believing that physicians make reliable,
accurate, and objective judgments about who is terminally ill and who
is competent. Even if doctors could make those judgments in a
manner that would inspire confidence in their ability to do so,
determining when a patient's pain is "sufficient" or when a patient has
16. For similar reasons, the practice of sedating patients (so that they do not experience
agonal breathing, for example) does not legitimate lethal prescriptions. While the difference
between a coincidental and a superseding cause is small, such a difference does exist. Anesthesiol-
ogists, for example, know the difference between medicating a patient to sleep and medicating a
patient to death; those who ignore the difference do not remain anesthesiologists for very long.
Here again the law has decided that if the choice is between forcing patients to die in pain and
allowing patients to die without pain, even if it coincidentally hastens death, the law will allow
appropriate amounts of pain medication to be used. See, Lawrence J. Schneiderman & Roger G.
Spragg, Ethical Decisions in Discontinuing Mechanical Ventilation, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 984
(1988).
17. See generally Guy I. Benrubi, Euthanasia-The Need for Procedural Safeguards, 326 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 197 (1992); Timothy E. Quill et al., Care of the Hopelessly Ill: Proposed Clinical
Criteria for Physician-Assisted Suicide, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1380 (1992).
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asked for aid in dying "enough" times introduces an intolerable
amount of subjectivity into what is supposed to be the product of
unbiased, scientific assessment.
Moreover, even if doctors could medically limit the exercise of this
right to competent, terminally-ill, adult patients, they would be legally
prohibited from doing so. The courts have stated that a patient's right
to refuse treatment may not be conditioned on qualifying language
about being terminally ill or imminently dying. 8 If this "right-to-
die" is the same as the "right-to-die" we've been litigating for years,
the considerations that invalidated such qualifications in natural death
acts will invalidate the same provisions if they appear in assisted
suicide statutes.
Nor would we be able to limit the exercise of this right to
competent adults. The "right to die" already extends to mature
minors, which means that assisted suicide would as well. And because
we cannot deny incompetent patients the rights that competent patients
enjoy, once we extend this right to competent patients we must also
extend it to incompetent patients. Even if that means offering assisted
suicide only when we have clear and convincing evidence that an
incompetent patient would want it, we must agree to some amount of
surrogate decisionmaking in this area, for we are constitutionally
prohibited from denying incompetent patients substantive rights that
competent patients enjoy. While this may sound like a slippery slope
argument, it is not. I am only restating what the law is in the "right-
to-die" area. Once this new right is inserted into the existing law, this.
right cannot be limited, as its advocates say it will be, unless we are to
disregard the jurisprudence that already has been firmly established in
this area.
IV. THE MORAL OPPOSITION
Having exposed some of the more obvious myths that plague this
area, let me address two others. The first myth is that the physician-
assisted suicide movement advances the cause of patients. The second
18. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986) (concluding that the right to have life support equipment disconnected is not
limited to comatose, terminally-ill patients or representatives acting on their behalf); In re Conroy,
486 A.2d 1209, 1226 (N.J. 1985) (determining that "a young, generally healthy person, has the
same right to decline life-saving medical treatment as a... person who is terminally ill"); In re
Deleo v. Westchester County Medical Ctr., 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 690-91 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)
(finding that "[t]he decisional law confirms that the desires of a young, generally healthy person
to refuse treatment are entitled to the same protection as those of an elderly, terminally-ill
individual").
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is that those who oppose and resist the legalization of physician-
assisted suicide from the pro-life or disability rights perspective are
saving us from a fate worse than a medicalized death and have our real
interests at heart.
The legalization of physician-assisted suicide does not empower
patients; it empowers physicians. No one is talking about legalizing
assisted suicide; all that's on the table is legalizing physician-assisted
suicide. It would allow physicians to act with impunity in an area
where they now may act only by running a substantial risk of civil or
criminal liability. If an indicator of power and authority is the ability
to act with impunity, then a statute that grants doctors immunity from
civil and criminal liability for doing what is now regarded as a form of
homicide certainly gives physicians considerable power.
The fact that the immunities afforded to physicians would not be
extended to others, whether they be other health care professionals or
family members, suggests that the legalization of physician-assisted
suicide strongly benefits physicians. After all, if we wanted to
maximize a patient's autonomy we could extend these immunities to
family members who render such services, or eliminate the statutes that
allow physicians to monopolize the distribution of controlled substan-
ces. If we legalize physician-assisted suicide, then anyone other than
a physician who helps a dying patient secure the drugs needed to
hasten death can be prosecuted for murder (which the state has an
interest in prohibiting) and for practicing medicine without a license
(which the medical profession has an interest in prohibiting).
While physicians clearly stand to benefit from such legislation, it
is not so clear that patients do. Patients will be left where they have
always been since the medical profession assumed authority over
decisions about death-having to ask for a physician's permission to
die how and when they wish. Physicians will be in a position to deny
such requests as they always have, by saying that the patient is not
competent or terminal, or by suggesting that the patient's pain is not
sufficient or the patient's requests not sufficiently sincere. Of all the
myths that plague this area, the most pernicious is that the legalization
of physician-assisted suicide would be a victory for patients. This
legalization would merely be a victory for the medical profession
dressed up as a victory for patients. It would not enhance the
autonomy of patients; it would maximize the power and authority of
physicians.
It comes as no surprise that some physicians are seeking to
enhance their power in this manner. For years, the medical profession
has gotten what it wants from civilians and legislators by playing its
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ace in the hole: power over death. Because physicians can "do
something" about death, we fund initiatives to postpone death and turn
to doctors when we are afraid of dying. As Jay Katz has shown,
physicians exploit the belief that they have some power over death.19
Although medicine cannot eliminate death, it can demonstrate its
power over death in one of two ways: by postponing it or expediting
it.20 The recent emergence of the concept of medical futility suggests
that medicine's ability to postpone death clearly is waning, which
means that medicine can sustain the privileged position it traditionally
has enjoyed only if it can convince us that it still has power over
death.21 Simply put, the profession is struggling to convince us that
the emperor still wears his regal robes. Thus, it is no coincidence that
some in the medical profession are seeking immunity for denying
patients medically-futile treatment at the same time that they are
seeking immunity for physician-assisted suicide. Although each
movement purports to protect the interests of patients, each is simply
about protecting the authority and power of the medical profession, by
seeing to it that death is completely medicalized.2
19. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 213-14 (1984).
20. For this insight, I am indebted to Zygmunt Bauman's brilliant essay, Modernity, or
Deconstructing Mortality, in Zygmunt Bauman, MORTALITY, IMMORTALITY & OTHER LIFE
STRATEGIES 129-60 (1992).
21. See Giles R. Scofield, Is Consent Useful When Resuscitation Isn't?, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 28.
22. The easiest way to see this is to examine the strikingly different arguments about the role
consent should play in decisions about assisted suicide and decisions about medically-futile
treatment. Where assisted suicide is at issue, dying patients are portrayed as competent, rational
persons whose wishes we should not deny. Where medically-futile treatment is at issue, these
dying patients become irrational, emotional persons, incapable of knowing what they want.
Because the same class of persons cannot be simultaneously capable and incapable of thinking for
themselves, the need to legitimate consent in the one instance and invalidate consent in the other
must rest on some other common denominator. Because the only result that each argument
justifies is granting immunity from civil and criminal liability to physicians for decisions to deny
futile treatment or to prescribe lethal medication, one is forced to conclude that this is what
motivates physicians to assume such contradictory, otherwise irreconcilable positions on such
matters. See, e.g., Howard Brody, Assisted Death-A Compassionate Response to a Medical Failure,
327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1384 (1992); Howard Brody, The Physician's Role in Determining Medical
Futility, 42 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 875 (1994). As medicine does what it can to perpetuate
the belief that doctors have some power over death (which they use to exploit patients, among
others), one is reminded of Anna Yeatman's apt observation of how doctors view discussions
about sharing power with patients and others. "The doctors interpreted this debate as a zero-sum
game: either they continued to be God, or civilization (science) as we have known it would
disappear." ANNA YEATMAN, POSTMODERN REVISIONINGS OF THE POLITICAL 51 (1994).
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V. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST LEGALIZATION:
HOW SOUND IS IT?
Having cast doubt on the argument made by those who favor the
legalization of physician-assisted suicide, it would be unwise for me not
to say something about those who have dedicated themselves to
resisting this trend. There are just as many good reasons to wonder
about the soundness of the "right-to-life's" opposition to the legaliza-
tion of physician-assisted suicide as there are to wonder about the
soundness of the arguments made by those who favor such legalization.
Interestingly, the "right-to-life" movement seems to have fallen
into the same error as the "right-to-die" movement has, i.e. of equating
decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment with decisions about
physician-assisted suicide. Having committed this basic error, it is no
wonder that its strategies have been so misguided. In addition to
resisting physician-assisted suicide, this movement has tended to
oppose a patient's right to forgo life-sustaining treatment, and has
made it particularly onerous for patients in New York and Missouri to
die naturally. The reasoning behind these tactics is as absurd as it is
simple, and runs something like this: If we make it too easy for
patients to forgo life-sustaining treatment, the next thing they will want
is the right to physician-assisted suicide. To avoid the legalization of
physician-assisted suicide, therefore, we must circumscribe decisions
to forgo life-sustaining treatment.
Think of what this really means. It amounts to saying that the
way to resist the call for one form of a medicalized death is to make it
as difficult as possible for patients to resist another form of a medical-
ized death. Further, this reasoning says that in order for patients not
to think that it is too easy to die, we must make it as hard as we
possibly can for them to die. Does anyone really think that if patients
were assured that they would be allowed to die naturally that they
would want physician-assisted suicide? Does anyone really believe that
a policy of requiring patients to endure a medically prolonged dying
discourages them from wanting a medically hastened exit?
On the basis of thinking such as this, Nancy Cruzan and her
family were dragged through the courts for several years, pounded
relentlessly by something called the clear and convincing evidence test.
Although one purpose in doing this was to quell the call for physician-
assisted suicide, I suspect these events only served to fan the flames.
The entire nation witnessed a decent family being prevented from
burying its daughter, with the blessings of the Missouri Supreme Court
and the United States Supreme Court. The impression created by the
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Cruzan debacle was that if one became incapacitated, one's family
could not, and the courts would not, come to one's aid. And if a
person is fearful of losing autonomy when incompetent, that person
understandably may try to maximize autonomy while competent.
Simply put, some people watched what happened to Nancy Cruzan and
decided that they'd better be able to get while the getting's good, the
very sentiments likely to make them demand the legalization of
physician-assisted suicide.
Just as there is reason to wonder about the coherence of the"right-to-life" movement's strategies and tactics, there is reason to
doubt that this movement has the real interests of patients at heart.
Although the pro-life movement claims to have the interests of persons
with disabilities at heart, it is fairly clear that persons with disabilities
are interested in a good deal more than the assurance that the last six
months of their existence will be completely medicalized. From my
own experience working with catastrophically injured patients, my
impression is that they are less concerned with how long they are going
to live than they are with how well they are going to live. To presume
that a longer life necessarily is a better life ignores how important the
quality of life is to the individual living it. If anything is clear, it is
that the disabilities rights and the "right-to-life" movements do not
share common ground, because persons with disabilities are interested
in more than living an extended life.23
VI. A NEW APPROACH
On the basis of the observations, what conclusions may we draw?
First, I think that many Americans are as afraid of living as they are
of dying in our health care system. All they see awaiting them is the
prospect of a medicalized death, over which neither they nor even their
families will have much control. And if forced to choose between a
medicalized death that prolongs the dying process and one that
shortens it, many are going to prefer the latter to the former-because
nothing else seems to be available. For that reason, I join with those
who believe that the call for physician-assisted suicide should be taken
23. See Dave Matheis, Still Looking for Common Ground: The National Right-to-Life
Committee and the Disability Rights Movement, DIsABILITY RAG RESOURCE, Sept.-Oct. 1993, at
34; Marilyn Golden, Do the Disability Rights and Right-to-Life Movements have Any Common
Ground?, DISABILITY RAG, Sept.-Oct. 1991, at 1. On this point, however, the "right-to-die"
movement does no better. Members of each group are so obsessed with insuring that no one dies
a bad death that they have lost sight of the fact that enjoying a good death does not mean much
to people who have not enjoyed a good life.
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as an indication that there is something terribly wrong with our health
care system.24
Second, I suspect patients want something that neither the "right-
to-die" nor the "right-to-life" movements are offering. Patients want
the assurance that life-sustaining treatment will be used sensibly and
sensitively, that their dying will not be prolonged or premature, and
that they will not have to suffer while awaiting their death. They want
to know that they and their families will be listened to and not
abandoned. They want to be able to die without inflicting emotional
and financial devastation on their families. And they want a system of
care in which they are not treated as corporate accounts whose medical
problems are managed by physicians who are technically competent but
personally distant. In short, what patients want is not a system of
care, but a system that cares.
If this is what concerns patients, then it will do little good to
spend much time thinking about whether we should offer or deny them
physician-assisted suicide. We are talking about more complex,
systemic problems than either the "right-to-die" or "right-to-life"
movements address. For this reason, I find the debate to be largely
irrelevant and quite distracting, which brings me to the last myth that
dominates this area: the myth that physician-assisted suicide is the
moral issue of our age.
Underlying the movement to legalize physician-assisted suicide is
the belief that we cannot regard our society as truly progressive and
morally sound until we eliminate the laws prohibiting assisted suicide,
which makes those who lead this cause the moral vanguard of patients'
rights. By the same token, those who spend their time resisting these
efforts pride themselves on defending the nation against the forces of
evil. What each shares is the belief that they are doing something
vitally important for us all, and that something dreadful will happen
if their view does not prevail. I wonder how valid such beliefs are.
They seem to stem from the wake of Roe v. Wade, 25 which is as
much the darling of the "pro-choice" movement as it is the villain of
24. Too many people have seen their friends and relatives endure needless suffering at
the hands of their doctors. The best respome we physicians can make to the euthanasia
movement is to provide better terminal care. We must reject the technological
imperative that compels us to use whatever treatments are available, regardless of
whether they are likely to offer our patients genuine benefit.
Robert I. Misbin, Physicians'Aid in Dying, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1307, 1311 (1991). See also
Elizabeth J. Latimer, Euthanasia: A Physician's Reflections. 6 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 487
(1991).
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
1995]
Seattle University Law Review
the "pro-life" movement. The dichotomized perspective adopted by
the United States Supreme Court in Roe dominates the debate about
decisions affecting life's beginnings and endings. The polarization and
politicization of questions concerning how and when life begins has
made it difficult, if not impossible, to converse sensibly about how and
when life ends.26
Without getting too much into the question of whether Roe was
rightly or wrongly decided, 27 let me suggest that the court got off to
a poor start by attempting to decide what our position on abortion
should be by limiting its perspective to the values of life and liberty,
and by digressing into a discussion about personhood. Instead of
asking how our beliefs about life and liberty inform our opinion on
abortion, the court should have asked a more fundamental question:
Do we take seriously the notion that men and women are and should
be equal before the eyes of the law? If so, how does our position on
equality inform our perspective on abortion? While I cannot say what
sort of conversation we would have had if the court had addressed and
answered those questions, I daresay it would have been a different and
more productive conversation than the one we have been having for the
past twenty-two years.
Suppose we considered legalizing physician-assisted suicide from
the perspective of justice, and not from the perspective of what life or
liberty are supposed to mean? If we asked what our belief in equality
suggests that our position on assisted suicide should be, we would not
be having the conversation we have been having here today. Think
how our discussion would alter.
I am certain that everyone has heard the expression about death
being the "great equalizer." The notion behind this sentiment is a
simple one: No matter who you are, rich or poor, privileged or not,
death treats us all alike; it does not discriminate on the basis of
anything. In reality, that sentiment has probably never been true,28
26. See generally Sandra H. Johnson, From Medicalization to Legalization to Politicization:
O'Connor, Cruzan, and Refusal of Treatment in the 1990s, 21 CONN. L. REV. 685 (1989).
27. For such a discussion, see Giles R. Scofield, Rethinking Roe, in TRENDS IN HEALTH
CARE, L. & ETHICS, Summer 1993, at 17.
28. There is a tendency to sentimentalize death, to believe that dying is worse for us than
it was for our predecessors, as if harkening back to the "good old days" would improve on how
we die. I doubt that anyone seriously wants to die the way people did during the years of plague,
famine, or warfare. I suspect that there really is no such thing as a "good death," if by a good
death one means a death that involves no sense of tragedy on the part of the deceased or the
survivors. What we really seem to want is that death not be as bad as it could be. In any event,
I suspect that it is not pleasant to die a violent death, which many Americans do. Those of us
who like to believe that modem medicine has spared or can spare us a "horrible" death should
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but it has never been less true than it is today. We do not die equal
deaths. Too many Americans die wretched deaths because they live
wretched lives-they live and die in squalor. They are the politically,
economically, and medically disenfranchised. The moral issue of our
day is not whether to enable or prevent a few individuals' dying in the
comfort of their home in the presence of their private physicians. The
moral issue of our day is whether to do something about our immoral
system of care, in which treatment is dispensed according to a principle
best characterized as that of economic apartheid.29
In a health care system such as ours, I fail to see how anyone can
claim to have the "right" to die a drug-induced death of one's choosing
in suburban comfort, while others die drug-related deaths, not of their
choosing, in urban squalor.30 I fail to see how anyone can claim that
the "special nature" of their relationship with their physician31 gives
them the "right" to have their death hastened, while the deaths of
others are hastened because they lack the very access to care needed to
have any, much less a special relationship, with a physician. By the
same token, I fail to see how anyone can claim to have helped the
elderly and the disabled when they do what they can to resist the
legalization of physician-assisted suicide, but do nothing to improve the
conditions under which the elderly and the disabled live and the
treatment that they receive.
The cause of working for or against the legalization of physician-
assisted suicide involves rights. However, that does not make the
cause itself right, unless there is a "right" to remain indifferent to the
cause of justice, or a "right" to treat equality as a second-class value.
Those of us who allow ourselves to be swept up in this debate, to
believe that we are on the cutting edge of the battle between right and
wrong, are simply using the cause of active euthanasia to create and
sustain our disposition towards what Judith Shklar calls passive
injustice-indifference to matters that we can do something about, but
wonder whether that is so. See LAURIE GARRETT, THE COMING PLAGUE: NEWLY EMERGING
DISEASES IN A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE (1994) (examining the history of diseases caused by
microbes and discussing the newly emerging viruses around the globe and the conditions which
support them).
29. Cf. Norton J. Greenberger et al., Universal Access to Health Care in America: A Moral
and Medical Imperative, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 637 (1990) (major reforms are necessary
in order to address problem of providing universal access to health care).
30. See PANEL ON UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROL OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING VIOLENCE (Albert J. Reiss, Jr. &
Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1993).
31. See Nancy S. Jecker, Giving Death a Hand: When the Dying and the Doctor Stand in a
Special Relationship, 39 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 831 (1991).
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choose not to.32 Once we bring questions of equality and justice into
this debate, things change radically. For while death does not
discriminate and treats each of us equally, we ourselves clearly do
discriminate and treat one another quite unequally, and nowhere more
so than in questions about how we live and how we die.
Several years ago Isaiah Berlin penned an important essay on the
nature of liberty, and wrote:
What troubles the consciences of Western liberals is not . . . the
belief that the freedom that men seek differs according to their social
or economic conditions, but that the minority who possess it have
gained it by exploiting, or, at least, averting their gaze from, the vast
majority who do not.... If the liberty of myself or my class...
depends on the misery of a number of other human beings, the
system which promotes this is unjust and immoral.33
More recently, the medical ethicist Emily Friedman has observed
that the medically indigent and disenfranchised represent the risk of
moral rot at the heart of our society, born of the callousness made
possible when we avert our gaze from human suffering created not by
disease, disability or even death-but by us.34
Death does not discriminate. We do. In choosing to focus our
attention on the rights of the few, we demonstrate our indifference to
the needs of the many. It is time for us to realize that our obsession
with the cause of individual rights, whether of liberty or of life, enables
us to ignore issues of justice. Regardless of whether it is right to be
for life or liberty (and I had always thought we were supposed to be
in favor of life and liberty), is it right to permit injustice, to ignore
inequality, to perpetuate the inequities that make some deaths so
horrible for so many? If we truly cared for and about one another, we
would turn our system of care into a system that cares, one that is
affordable, decent, available, and equitable. But in keeping with the
disposition of a country dedicated to possessive individualism, we have
decided to look out for ourselves, and not to look out for others. The
myth here is that none of us can or will become the "other"-someone
who is economically, politically, and medically disenfranchised.3"
Such a fate can befall more of us than we would like to believe.
32. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE (1990).
33. ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 125 (1969).
34. Emily Friedman, The Torturer's Horse, 261 JAMA 1481, 1482 (1989).
35. See KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, FALLING FROM GRACE: THE EXPERIENCE OF
DOWNWARD MOBILITY IN THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASS (1988); KATHERINE S. NEWMAN,
DECLINING FORTUNES: THE WITHERING OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (1993).
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To change the perspective of the issue alters one's view about
what our solution ought to be, a shift not welcomed by those who
advocate the legalization of physician-assisted suicide.36 For to alter
the perspective from one of rights to one of justice forces us to admit
that our health care system is unjust-and for that reason, the system
cannot be right. To make it "right" would require much more than
changing an obscure section of the criminal law. It would require us
to take seriously what it means for us to care for and about one
another. It is easy to come out in favor of life or liberty. To come out
in favor of justice, on the other hand, means that you have to put your
money where your mouth is, something that we are reluctant to do in
this day and age."
VII. CONCLUSION: DOING THE DUTCH, OR DOING
WHAT THE DUTCH Do?
From my perspective, our solution to the legalization of physician-
assisted suicide is both simple and complex. If, as we are led to
believe, we should be doing what they are doing in The Netherlands,
then our path is clear. First, we should not legalize physician-assisted
suicide, because it remains a crime in the Netherlands. Second, we
should commit ourselves to creating a health care system that is as
accessible, affordable, decent, and equitable as the Dutch health care
system is. While -I suspect that there are limits to what we can and
should do to improve how we die, we have not reached the limits of
what we can do to improve how we live. If what really makes for a
good death is a good life--one that is as rich, meaningful, and fulfilling
as it can be-then once we have improved on life, we may find
ourselves agreeing with the ancient wisdom that we should leave death
alone. Death can take care of itself. What we need to do is take care
of one another.
36. When Dr. Quill went public about the case of Diane in the New England Journal of
Medicine, a few readers wrote in wondering if it would be more progressive to do something
about the sort of care everyone gets than about the sort of death a few are able to procure. Joanne
Lynn & Joan Teno, Letter to the Editor, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 659 (1991); Giles R. Scofield,
Letter to the Editor, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 659 (1991). While agreeing that our health care
system is "woefully inadequate in meeting the basic needs of housing, food, and access to medical
care," Dr. Quill states that "to deny self-determination to hopelessly ill persons until these
systematic inadequacies can be solved only compounds the injustice." Timothy E. Quill, Reply,
325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 660 (1991). Under this line of reasoning, granting new rights to a few
while many still lack basic rights eliminates an injustice. The mistake in this logic is the belief
that the wants of the few are worth more than the needs of the many.
37. See generally For Richer, for Poorer, ECONOMIST, Nov. 5, 1994, at 19.
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